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Case Comment
Consiiiuiional Law: Warrantless Parole Officer
Searches-A New Rationale
While on parole from a California armed robbery conviction,
Clifford Latta was arrested by his parole officer at the home
of an acquaintance when the officer found him holding a pipe
containing marijuana. Six hours after Latta's arrest, the parole
officer and two local police officers searched his house. Latta's
stepdaughter admitted the officers after they assured her that
they did not need a search warrant. In the garage they found
four-and-one-half pounds of marijuana. On the basis of this
evidence, Latta was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute. A federal district court denied his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus" and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the warrant clause of the fourth
amendment does not extend to searches by parole officers and
that the guarantee against unreasonable searches bars only those
parole officer searches that are arbitrary, harassing, or intimidat-
ing. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975).
The fourth amendment guarantees freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures and provides that search warrants may
be issued only upon probable cause.2 It is well established that
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
Latta contended that the search was unreasonable within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment and that the seized evidence should there-
fore have been excluded from his trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), established the principle that the fourth amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures is incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See generally Schrock &
Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 1MTNN. L. RsV. 251 (1974). Latta also argued that even
if the search was legitimate, the evidence obtained should be admissible
only at a parole revocation hearing, not at a criminal trial. For a dis-
cussion of this argument and the response of the court, see note 60 infra
and accompanying text.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
is an essential component of the due process of law secured by
the fourteenth amendment.3 The Supreme Court in recent years
has stressed that the reasonableness clause must be defined, at
least to some extent, by the specific commands of the warrant
clause. 4 This approach is reflected in the principle that, subject
only to a few specific and well-delineated exceptions, warrantless
searches are unreasonable per se.1i Three categories of excep-
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that the standard
for procuring a warrant is identical under both the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
4. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1971); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 358 (1974). For a general, historical discussion of the Court's
approach to the relationship between the warrant and reasonableness
clauses of the fourth amendment, see Note, The Right of the People To
Be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1119, 1119-20 (1967).
5. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). But see Alme~da-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 289 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 318 (1971).
The exceptions are narrowly drawn, see Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 499 (1958), and the party urging such an exception must prove
its necessity. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1970);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). In concluding that parole officer
searches are sui generis as to the fourth amendment warrant clause, the
Ninth Circuit, at least, has taken the position that such searches are one
of the exceptions to this principle. 521 F.2d at 250-51. The question re-
mains an open one, however; the Supreme Court has denied certiorari
in cases where parolees have been accorded the same fourth amendment
guarantees as ordinary citizens and in cases where the opposite conclu-
sion has been reached. In State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970), the Supreme Court of Iowa stated:
Confining ourselves to seizure of evidence relative to a new and
independent criminal action, we believe it fairer and far more
realistic that an Iowa State parolee's Fourth Amendment rights,
privileges and immunities be accorded the same recognition as
any other person. In fact there is to us no apparent constitution-
ally adequate or permissible basis upon which to hold otherwise.
In sharp contrast, the California court of appeals in People v. Hernan-
dez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965), stated that
[for the purpose of maintaining the restraints and social safe-
guards accompanying the parolee's status, the authorities may
subject him, his home and his effects to such constant or occa-
sional inspection and search as may seem advisable to them.
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the parallel guaranty in arti-
cle I, section 19 of the California Constitution block that scrutiny.
Accord, People v. West, 253 Cal. App. 2d 348, 61 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 663 (1968).
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tions to this general principle can be identified from the Supreme
Court cases.6 First, no warrant is required if the person affected
or someone authorized to act for him voluntarily consents to the
search.7 Second, no warrant is required for a limited class of
routine searches.8 Third, no warrant is required where the
exigencies of the search render obtaining it impractical.9
With the exception of California, the search and seizure
rights of parolees at issue in Latta have rarely been litigated in
either state or federal courts. In California, the courts have con-
sistently held that the nature of parole requires that parolees be
denied the constitutional safeguards of privacy afforded to ordi-
nary citizens.10 Most other courts that have confronted this issue
have followed the lead of the California courts."1 Despite this uni-
formity, the rationales advanced by these courts for abridging the
fourth amendment rights of parolees, "grace," "contract-consent,"
and "custody," have been largely discredited.1 2 Recently, a
6. For a detailed analysis of the exceptions the Supreme Court has
recognized, see Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 358; Note, The Law of Ad-
ministrative Inspections: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?,
1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 313, 324-33.
7. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-46 (1973); Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582 (1946).
8. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (inventory search of
vehicle in police custody); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973) (border searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972) (premises search of firearms dealer).
9. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search
of vehicle upon probable cause); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (warrantless search incident to valid arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk upon sufficient facts to believe suspect
armed and dangerous); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(blood test for intoxication).
10. The most frequently cited California case is People v. Hernan-
dez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
11. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972);
People v. Chinnici, 51 Misc. 2d 570, 273 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Nassau Cty.
Ct. 1966). But see People v. Eastin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 512, 289 N.E.2d 673
(1972) (dictum); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970).
12. Historically, the courts have employed three major rationales
to avoid confronting the issue of what protection the fourth amendment
extends to parolees. Two of the rationales, grace and contract-consent,
have received extensive criticism. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other
grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971)
(grace rationale); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451
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few courts have responded to this theoretical void by articulating
two new rationales. The first of these is that without broad
search powers parole officers cannot effectively supervise parol-
ees. 13 The second, related closely to the first, is that
parolees pose a sufficient threat to society to necessitate close
regulation.14
The Ninth Circuit based its opinion in Latta on both of these
new rationales for abridging the fourth amendment rights of
parolees. It adopted the first by asserting that effective
supervision of parolees requires frequent and unannounced
searches even though little antecedent justification for such
action can be shown.15 The court explained that parole of-
ficers need broad search powers because the other investigatory
techniques available to them are inadequate to provide all of the
information necessary for parolee supervision. Although it
acknowledged that any search of a parolee's dwelling by a parole
officer must pass the fourth amendment test of reasonableness,
the court concluded that the administrative necessity of discre-
tionary parole officer searches satisfies the constitutional man-
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (contract-consent rationale). The fundamental dif-
ference between these two rationales lies in their assumptions about the
manner in which liberty is restored to the parolee. Under the grace ra-
tionale, the state is said to have acted ex gratia, to have conferred only
a privilege and not a legally protected right and to be able to revoke
the privilege at its whim. But see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). Under the contract-consent rationale, restoration is said to be
the result of a bargain by which the parolee consents to submit to any
restrictions the state may impose on him in exchange for his freedom.
For an excellent discussion of these two rationales and the weaknesses
of each, see Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Con-
ditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Parole: A
Critique]. The third, more durable, rationale is that of custody. See,
e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). The core of this approach
is the premise that a parolee is in the constructive custody of his parole
officer. Prison authorities may conduct extensive searches of a prisoner's
cell, and a parole officer is said to be similarly free to search the dwell-
ing of his parolee. To some extent, the durability of the custody ration-
ale is attributable to legislative endorsement. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3056 (West 1970). The custody rationale also has received sharp criti-
cism, however. See Parole: A Critique, supra, at 711-30; Note, Extend-
ing Search and Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L.
Rav. 129, 133 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Extending Search and Seizure
Protection]. The court in Latta alluded to the custody rationale, but ac-
knowledged its limitations and did not rely on it. 521 F.2d at 248.
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972).
14. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975).
15. 521 F.2d at 251.
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date.16 In elaborating this standard, the court suggested that
even a "hunch" based on what a parole officer had seen or heard
would be sufficient to support a finding of reasonableness.'7
Hence parole officer searches are rendered reasonable per se, un-
less the officer has acted in an arbitrary, harassing, or intimidat-
ing manner.' s Since most parole officer searches would there-
fore be reasonable, the court concluded that requiring a warrant
would afford parolees only superfluous protection. 9
While the court of appeals justified broad power to search on
the basis of the inadequacy of other investigatory techniques, at
least one commentator has cogently argued that following the
movements of the parolee, interviewing his acquaintances, and
making daytime surprise home visits would provide the necessary
information.20 By failing to convincingly demonstrate the linita-
16. Id. at 250.
17. Sharply criticizing this suggestion by the majority, Judge Choy,
concurring, expressed concern that the "hunch" rationale would provide
parole officers with license to abuse their power to search. 521 F.2d at
253. The majority defended its grant of broad discretion to parole offi-
cers by arguing that the officer knows more about his parolees than does
anyone else. 521 F.2d at 250. This unsubstantiated assumption of close
contact between parole officers and their parolees is questionable, how-
ever. See id. at 253 (Wright, J., concurring); United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright, J., concurring)
(companion case).
18. In United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971), the district court reached the same con-
clusion by relying on the grace rationale. Courts have been extremely
reluctant to invalidate a search on the ground that it was harassing or
intimidating. See White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and
Probationers, 31 U. PITt. L. R V. 167 (1969).
19. 521 F.2d at 252.
20. See White, supra note 18, at 186-93; Extending Search and
Seizure Protection, supra note 12, at 137-40. If carefully circumscribed,
daytime surprise home visits could be exempted from the warrant
requirement, they would be considerably less intrusive than searches,
yet would allow a parole officer to gather a great deal of the in-
formation he needs to perform his rehabilatory and supervisory
functions. See Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282
(1971); cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (discussed at notes 24-
26 infra and accompanying text). For example, a parole officer could
ascertain that the parolee is at home when he should be at work and,
at the same time, assess the condition of the parolee's living quarters.
See White, supra note 18, at 188.
Parolees with a history of drug use present a special problem. In
such cases periodic administration of drug detection tests and personal
searches may be necessary for effective supervision. See Extending
Search and Seizure Protection, supra note 12, at 139. One approach
would be to require the parole board to determine at the time of parole
whether personal searches are necessary. The parole-board would be
19761
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tions of these techniques, the court in effect assumed its conclu-
sion that the interest of the state in supervising parolees requires
such a broad definition of reasonableness. As a result, the court's
observation that the warrant requirement offers no real protec-
tion and may therefore be disregarded is unpersuasive. More-
over, even if alternative information-gathering methods were in-
adequate, this fact alone would not provide sufficient basis for
abrogating the constitutional rights of parolees. The court's im-
plicit premise-that the public interest justifies such an abridge-
ment-must also be convincingly demonstrated.
Attempting to do just that, the court of appeals invoked the
second new rationale for limiting the fourth amendment rights
of parolees. The court maintained that the threat parolees
pose to society is sufficient to necessitate close regulation of
their conduct.2 1 The assumption underlying this theory is that
fourth amendment rights may be circumscribed whenever an
identifiable class of individuals poses such a threat.22  Appli-
cation of this reasoning to classes other than parolees, however,
demonstrates its fallaciousness. For example, ex-convicts prob-
ably pose as significant a threat to society as do parolees, yet they
are not denied full fourth amendment rights.23 The clear danger
of this threat rationale is the ease with which it can be extended
to any identifiable class for which the incidence of criminal con-
duct is above some predetermined norm.
The principal precedents adduced by the court of appeals in
support of its decision in Latta were three Supreme Court cases
concerning administrative searches. In Wyman v. James2 4 the
'Court held that a visit by a welfare worker to the home of a wel-
fare recipient, made in accordance with statutory regulations, did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Unlike a criminal search, the home visit had only a limited
investigatory purpose, and refusal to permit the home visit posed
no threat of criminal penalty. The Court also held that even if
the home visit exhibited some of the characteristics of a search,
the fourth amendment test of reasonableness had been satisfied.2-5
empowered to issue a "personal inspection" warrant authorizing personal
searches for the duration of the individual's parole. The issuance of the
warrant could be challenged by the parolee in the courts. See White,
supra note 18, at 192.
21. 521 F.2d at 249.
22. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
24. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
25. The court in Latta relied on this alternative ground for the
[Vol. 60:805
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In reaching this conclusion, it stressed the carefully limited statu-
tory authorization for the visit and the interest of the state in
preventing misuse of public funds and protecting children from
abuse. 26  More recently, in United States v. BisweIU27 the
Court upheld a warrantless search of a locked firearms store-
room, emphasizing the significant public interest in the regula-
tion of interstate firearms traffic and the crucial role of inspec-
tion in such regulation. Before these two cases, the Court in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States2s had suggested that
Congress possessed the power to authorize warrantless searches
of the premises of liquor dealers inasmuch as the liquor industry
traditionally had been closely regulated.29
Wyman holding; it did not argue that the actions of Latta's parole officer
amounted to something other than a search. 521 F.2d at 250.
26. One reading of Wyman is that it creates an implied-consent ex-
ception to the warrant requirement: Participation in a government pro-
gram constitutes an acceptance of all reasonable conditions the govern-
ment chooses to impose. While this interpretation is consistent with the
Latta court's reliance on Wyman, application of it to parole officer
searches would amount to a revival of the discredited contract-consent
rationale. See note 12 supra.
27. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
28. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
29. In Colonnade, federal agents who were denied admission to a
locked liquor storeroom forcibly entered it and conducted a warrantless
inspection. The Court concluded that the fine authorized by 26 U.S.C.
§ 7342-the only statutory sanction for refusal to permit such a warrant-
less inspection-is exclusive. Therefore, the agents were not entitled to
forcibly enter the storeroom. While refusing to uphold the validity of
the particular forcible entry at issue in Colonnade, the Court did endorse
warrantless inspections of the premises of liquor dealers as authorized
by 26 U.S.C. § 5146 and 26 U.S.C. § 7606.
The essential flaw in the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Wyman, Biswell,
and Colonnade is that it considered them out of their proper context.
Before these three cases the Supreme Court had invalidated warrantless
searches in two other administrative-search situations. In Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the fourth
amendment prohibited a warrantless administrative search for suspected
housing code violations because the intrusion into privacy necessarily in-
volved in such a search outweighed the government's interests in con-
ducting it. In a companion case, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the
Court extended the Camara holding to cover inspections of business
premises. Certainly Camara, inasmuch as that case involved an at-
tempted search of a residence, deserved consideration in Latta. It seems
self-evident that any attempt to extrapolate the Supreme Court's admin-
istrative-search cases to other areas must consider not only Wyman, Bis-
well, and Colonnade, in which warrantless searches were endorsed, but
also Camara and See, in which warrantless searches were invalidated.
In her dissenting opinion in Latta, Judge Hufstedler argued that in ap-
plying these cases to parole officer searches the majority had seriously
distorted their meaning. 521 F.2d at 254. For a good synoptical treat-
ment of these cases, see Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 Mrru.
L. REV. 607, 612-18 (1974).
19761
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The court of appeals discerned five factors from these cases
and relied on them in treating parole officer searches as an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. First, the court considered
whether the warrantless search had been statutorily authorized.3 0
Because such authorization represents a legislative determination
of reasonableness, the Supreme Court in the administrative-
search cases considered it a necessary condition for a valid war-
rantless search. The court of appeals acknowledged that no Cali-
fornia statute authorizes a warrantless parole officer search, but
maintained that state case law provides an adequate substitute.31
The Supreme Court, however, has not addressed the question
whether case law can substitute for statutory authorization, and
the court of appeals ignored important differences between the
two. In Biswell and Colonnade statutory authorization played a
crucial role in the Court's balance of private and governmental
interests; indeed, the Court grounded the validity of those war-
rantless searches on the traditional legislative power to regulate
the firearms and liquor trades. Even if one makes the dubious
assumption that parolees can be equated to firearms and liquor,
that is, that states have a traditional and substantial interest in
regulating their behavior, the rationale underlying Biswell and
Colonnade still requires an analysis of the relative weight of the
parolee's interest in privacy. Moreover, statutory authorization is
pertinent on a purely practical level as well. In Wyman the stat-
ute established explicit limitations on the permissible scope of the
home visit. Case law rarely achieves a comparable degree of
specificity.3 2
Second, the court summarily discounted the parolee's interest
in privacy. rt simply asserted ihat a parolee, like the fire-
arms dealer in Bisweli, lacked the ordinary citizen's justifiable
expectation of privacy. But in Biswell, the Supreme Court
30. In upholding visits to the home of welfare recipients in Wyman,
the Supreme Court stressed the carefully regulated procedure for such
visits prescribed by New York law. The Court in Biswell upheld the
validity of warrantless inspections specifically authorized by the Gun
Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1970). In Colonnade the
Court approved warrantless inspections of the premises of liquor dealers
authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 5146 and 26 U.S.C. § 7606, but refused to uphold
a forcible entry where the controlling statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7342, did not
provide for forcible entry as a remedy for refusal to permit a warrantless
search.
31. 521 F.2d at 251.
32. The lack of such specificity increases the likelihood of searches
that exceed permissible bounds. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246,
256 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 60:805
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tied its analysis of justifiable expectations to the existence of
express statutory authorization for a warrantless search, main-
taining that such authorization correspondingly reduced the in-
dividual's expectation of privacy.33 The court of appeals con-
cluded, by contrast, that a parolee's expectation of privacy is
sufficiently reduced merely by his status as a parolee.3 4 The
ramifications of such a modification of the Supreme Court's
position extend far beyond the context of parole. Because
the court failed to articulate the rationale for this extrap-
olation, it is unclear to what extent the court would limit
abridgement of constitutional rights of others on the basis of
mere status. Central to the justifiable expectation-of-privacy
standard advanced by the Supreme Court is recognition that
even statutory limitations of privacy create the expectation that
privacy not expressly restricted is inviolate.
Third, the court concluded that requiring a warrant would
inhibit the functioning of the parole system by creating unneces-
sary difficulty for parole officers seeking to uncover illegal
activity. Again in Biswell, the Supreme Court suggested that
a warrant requirement for inspections of firearms dealers'
premises could deprive inspectors of the flexibility they require
with respect to the time, scope, and frequency of inspections.3 5
The circuit court, in perceiving a similar danger of frustration if
the warrant requirement were applied to parole officer searches,
equated premises searches of firearms dealers with home
searches of parolees. In so doing, it failed to explain how a prob-
able cause standard would frustrate anything, and it ignored the
Supreme Court's concern in the administrative-search cases with
the type and weight of private interest involved. Thus, despite
the possibility that a probable cause standard might prevent a
particular search, it seems doubtful that parole searches can as a
general matter fit within the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement, inasmuch as nothing inheres in the parole context
that would suggest a special need to avoid the destruction or
disappearance of evidence. The Latta court said in effect that
parole officers must be unencumbered by probable cause, since
they generally will be unable to establish it. The implicit as-
33. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). All firearms
dealers were informed of the controlling statutes when applying for a
license and were sent updated copies of these statutes annually. Id. at
316.
34. 521 F.2d at 251. This theory is essentially a variation of the
contract-consent rationale. See note 12 supra.
35. 406 U.S. at 316.
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sumption-that a theoretical form of probable cause exists at all
times solely because parolees are parolees-is especially trou-
bling. For, with respect to the interests involved here, a search of
an individual's home poses a threat to personal privacy not typ-
ically present in an inspection of business premises.36 Only in
Wyman did the Supreme Court authorize a warrantless entry in-
to the home, and in that case the Court carefully differentiated
a home visit by a welfare worker from a criminal search.37 More-
over, none of the administrative-search cases involved searches as
comprehensive as the one at issue in Latta. In any event, the
Ninth Circuit's attempt to stretch the Biswefl frustration ration-
ale to parole officer searches is especially egregious in view of the
facts in Latta. The particular facts before the court failed to sug-
gest even a hint of exigency. The challenged search was simply an
attempt to gather additional evidence after detention of the
parolee. It is difficult to imagine how requiring a warrant would
have frustrated such an effort.
Fourth, the court determined that deterrence could best be
served by frequent and unannounced searches. To be sure, this
proposition is a safe one in any context. Thus, in Biswell the
Supreme Court endorsed warrantless searches of the premises
of firearms dealers by asserting that frequent and unannounced
searches were essential as a creditable deterrent to illegal activ-
ity.38 The circuit court, however, seriously distorted the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court by equating the need for frequent
and unannounced parole officer searches with the need for war-
rantless searches of firearms dealers. In Biswell, the Court
emphasized the strong public interest in avoiding unlawful sales
of firearms, the peculiar need for warrantless searches in the
context of firearms traffic, and the minimal threat to personal
privacy posed by such searches in that context.39  Inasmuch
36. This threat to personal privacy may account for the Court's con-
cern with the possibility that a search would result in criminal sanction.
In Wyman the Court upheld a warrantless home visit, but in so doing
it stressed that no threat of criminal sanction existed. 400 U.S. at 317.
The Court distinguished Camara, in which a warrant for a home inspec-
tion had been required, on the ground that that case involved a search
for criminal violations. Id. at 324-25. In Biswell, however, the Court
upheld a warrantless inspection of business premises for possible crim-
inal violations. 406 U.S. at 315. One factor that might be relied on to
reconcile Wyman and Biswefl is the greater threat to personal privacy
typically posed by a home search.
37. 400 U.S. at 317-18.
38. 406 U.S. at 316.
39. Id. at 317.
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as allowing parole officers to conduct warrantless home search-
es with little antecedent justification poses a substantial threat
to personal privacy, the court in Latta should have asked wheth-
er the public interest in controlling the conduct of parolees
is strong enough to justify such searches and whether, if so, they
are indeed necessary.
Fifth, the court considered the pervasiveness of the regula-
tion of the person or premises searched. The Supreme Court
in Biswell and Colonnade examined the searches of firearms and
liquor dealers in light of the traditionally broad power of
Congress to regulate in these areas. The Ninth Circuit in Latta
equated the pervasiveness of this regulation with parole supervi-
sion-a dubious equation at best. But even if the validity of
the comparison were assumed,40 it would not dispose of the
problem. Determination of the limitations on parole officer
searches must be reached after balancing the threat to privacy
with the interests of the state in conducting the searches.
It thus appears that the recent Supreme Court administra-
tive-search cases provide tenuous support for the circuit court's
decision to treat parole officer searches as an exception to the
general principle that warrantless searches are unreasonable per
se. Moreover, in addition to the constitutional problems it raises,
the court's decision exacerbates at least three problems that
would not exist if parole officers were required to obtain search
warrants issued on probable cause.
41
The first problem is the protection of parolees from harass-
ment. The court in Latta relied on the self-control and training
of parole officers as safeguards against harassment.42  It
considered later review by parole authorities and the courts to
be sufficient to protect the parolee from the consequences of a
harassing search and to deter any such conduct in the future 3
However, two basic flaws inhere in this reasoning. First, the
court's conclusion assumes that parolees would be able and will-
40. But see notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
41. Under the warrant requirement a parole officer would have to
establish that he had probable cause to believe, first, that the parolee
had violated parole or that such a violation was imminent and, second,
that the search would uncover evidence of the actual or impending viola-
tion. Cf., e.g., United States v. Ventresea, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); United
States v. Boyd, 422 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1970); Durham v. United States,
403 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1968), affd after remand, 419 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.
1969), vacated, 401 U.S. 481 (1971); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d
310 (1st Cir. 1966).
42. 521 F.2d at 252.
43. Id.
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ing to. challenge an unreasonable search. But if the search pro-
duced incriminating evidence, justifying it after the fact would be
easy under the "hunch" standard established in Latta.44 And if
the search failed to produce incriminating evidence, a parolee
might be reticent, for fear of alienating his supervisor and risking
his conditional liberty, to venture a challenge. 45 Second, the anal-
ysis ignores the fact that the narrow interests of parole authori-
ties may diverge from broader state policy. The state has two ma-
jor interests regarding parole: rehabilitation of the parolee and
protection of the public.46 Parole authorities may emphasize
other interests, however, such as mere ease of administration.47
If this were the case, the proper balance of state and parolee in-
terests could become distorted.48 By contrast, a requirement that
a parole officer obtain a warrant would provide a parolee with at
least some protection from arbitrary and harassing searches by
forcing the officer to develop a basis for the proposed search
in light of the probable cause standard.49
Proper treatment of warrantless searches involving both
police and parole officers is the second problem that arises from
disavowal of the warrant requirement. Joint searches are ana-
lytically troublesome, since most courts have held that a police
officer must obtain a warrant before searching a parolee's dwell-
ing.50 The courts that have faced the joint-search problem have
not resolved it uniformly, as experience in California demon-
strates. The California Court of Appeals for the First District in
44. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 471-72 n.532.
45. See authorities cited in note 44 supra; cf. Amsterdam, The Su-
preme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 785, 786-87 (1970); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
46. See Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 295(1971).
47. Id.
48. See Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 414. There are indications that
reliance on the good faith and restraint of parole officers is unjustified.
Parole officers have been accused of harassing politically active parolees
See In re Cleaver, 266 Cal. App. 2d 143, 72 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968). There is also evidence that sorae parole officers have pressured
parolees into becoming informers. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMocRIw.ac SOCIETY 152-54 (1969).
49. See White, supra note 18.
50. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1975); People v. Thompson, 252 Cal. A-p. 2d 76, 60 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (dictum), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968); People v.
Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975). But see People v. Giles, 233
Cal. App. 2d 643, 43 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (parole officer
may designate police officer as stand-in).
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People v. Gilkey5 l held that a joint search without a warrant is
valid so long as the parole officer reasonably suspected that the
parolee was violating his parole. The second district court of ap-
peals in People v. Limon5 2 held that such a search is valid so long
as the officers complied with the state law requiring announce-
ment before forcible entry. And in People v. Coffman53 the
third district court of appeals held that the validity of the search
depends on whether it was conducted for parolee supervision or
further criminal investigation.5 4 The admissibility of evidence
obtained as a result of warrantless joint searches is thus left to
varying interpretation.5 5  One approach to alleviating this
uncertainty would be to validate any search in which a parole
officer participated.5" This approach would only enhance the
possibility of the police using parole officers as a means of legiti-
mizing otherwise illegal searches.57  The better alternative
would be to require both parole and police officers to obtain war-
rants. Since both officers would first have to be able to establish
probable cause,5 8 the admissibility of evidence obtained would
not depend on who conducted the search.
The third problem is the use at trial of the evidence seized
in a parole officer search. The court of appeals in Latta held
that such evidence could be used at both a parole revocation
hearing and a new criminal trial.59 Since the court specifically
exempted parole officer searches from the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment, evidence that would be inadmissible
at the trial of an ordinary citizen60 may be introduced at the
51. 6 Cal. App. 3d 183, 85 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
52. 255 Cal. App. 2d 519, 63 Cal. Rptr. 91 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 866 (1967). Judge Hufstedler, who dissented in Latta,
wrote the opinion in Limon.
53. 2 Cal. App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
54. Id. at 688, 82 Cal. Rptr at 786. See People v. Way, 65 Misc.
2d 865, 319 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Nassau County Ct. 1971) (three inquiries must
be made: Who was the "prime mover" behind the search, did the police
actually search, and was the primary purpose parolee supervision or fur-
therance of police investigation).
55. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule and the admissibility
of illegally obtained evidence, see note 1 supra.
56. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 512 F.2d 246, 253 (9th Cir. 1975) (Wright,
J., concurring).
57. For an extreme example of an attempt by police to use a parole
officer to validate an illegal search, see United States v. Hallman, 365
F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966).
58. See note 41 supra.
59. 521 F.2d at 252-53.
60. If the initial procurement of evidence by a parole officer is law-
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trial of a parolee.6 1 In concluding that broad search power is
a prerequisite for effective parolee supervision, the court ob-
scured this significant effect of permitting warrantless searches.
For even if an unfettered power to search were necessary to
accomplishment of the purposes of parole, such a power could
not be said to be necessary for purposes of the criminal law in
general. Mapp v. Ohio"2 held in effect that the latter purposes
fail to justify searches based on less than probable cause. Latta
thus affords the government a means of circumventing the exclu-
sionary rule in cases involving parolees.
Perhaps, then, the least restrictive alternative consistent
with the broad purpose of parole embraced by the Ninth Circuit
is to allow parole officers more discretion to search than is per-
mitted by the probable cause standard, but to limit use of the
fruits of such searches to parole revocation hearings. However,
courts are unwilling to exclude from criminal trials evidence
legally obtained.63 Thus the only feasible means of ensuring a
parolee in criminal trial the same constitutional protections pos-
sessed by other citizens may be to require parole officers to obtain
search warrants issued on probable cause.
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
in Latta, the rationales underlying most of the earlier cases con-
cerning fourth amendment rights of parolees have been dis-
credited.64 A reappraisal of the status of parolees seems in
ful, most courts will justify its use in any subsequent proceeding. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441
F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404: U.S. 1025 (1972). An argument
can be made, however, that since evidence procured as a result of a war-
rantless search cannot be used to convict an ordinary citizen, use of such
evidence in the criminal trial of a parolee constitutes a denial of equal
protection. See State v. Cullison, 173 -X.W.2d 533 (Iowa) (alternative
holding), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970). This rationale is attractive
since it would preserve the use of evidence seized in warrantless parole
officer searches at parole revocation hearings because an ordinary citizen
would never face such a proceeding.
61. See note 1 supra.
62. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. See note 60 supra.
64. 521 F.2d at 248. Case law in this area is currently in a state
of flux. The extreme positions are represented by State v. Cullison, 173
N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970), and People v. Her-
nandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). See note 5 supra. Several courts have
recently adopted a "middle ground" approach, expressly rejecting both
Hernandez and Cullison. Although approving warrantless searches, they
have employed a narrower definition of "reasonableness" than that fol-
lowed in Latta. See People v. Anderson, 536 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1975)(parole officer must have reasonable grounds to believe a parole viola-
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order, inasmuch as assumptions about that status form the core
of recent judicial opinions that, like Latta, restrict individual
liberty in ways that may be unnecessary. In any case, the courts
must recognize that the viability of the parole system, however
desirable, is not necessarily furthered by minimizing the fourth
amendment rights of parolees. 65 Indeed, a number of commen-
tators have suggested that the present policy of allowing unfet-
tered parole officer searches is actually counterproductive. 66 Au-
thorizing warrantless searches to solve the problem of inade-
quate parolee supervision generates tensions and stifles develop-
ment and refinement of other information-gathering techniques.
And even if broad discretion to search is deemed necessary in
the context of parole, courts could attempt to define permissible
limits more precisely than did the court of appeals in Latta.67
Rather than embracing a "hunch" standard, bereft of content,
that court might have asked whether the purposes of parole are
so broad as to require a warrantless search of Latta's home after
he had been detained. Surely in Latta's case a warrant require-
ment would have frustrated nothing whatsoever. It is hoped
that the sweeping endorsement of warrantless parole officer
searches by the Ninth Circuit has not seriously lessened the
possibility of significant positive change in this area of the law.
tion has occurred); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 55, 516 P.2d 1088
(1973) (parole officer must have well-founded suspicion that parole vio-
lation has occurred).
65. See White, supra note 18.
66. See, e.g., Extending Search and Seizure Protection, supra note
12; Comment, supra note 46.
67. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 4.
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